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Can Distraint Stand Up as a
Landlord's
. Remedy?
GERALD KoRNGOLD*

Though a landlord's right of seizure is well established in the
common law and provided for by the laws of many states, some
federal courts have found distraint procedures to be incompatible
with Fourteenth Amendment due process requirements. This article examines the constitutionality and validity of the present
Pennsylvania distraint statute, surveys the cases dealing with the
issue, and reviews some recent decisions concerning due process
which are relevant to the determination of the statute's constitutionality. The Pennsylvania experience can serve as an example for
practitioners in other jurisdictions since, most of them have had
few, if any, cases concerning the validity of their distraint statutes,
while.there have been a number of decisions dealing with the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania law.
Introduction
The Penµsylvania Landlord and Tenant Act allows for the procedure of distraint. 1 Under the statute, a landlord or his agent may
• Gerald Korngold is a member of the Class of 1977 of the University
of Pennsylvania Law School.
1 Pub. L. No. 69, Art. III, § 301 (April 6, 1951); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 68,
§ 250.302 et seq.
Other states also have statutes providing for distraint. E.g., Del. Code
Ann. tit. 25, § 6301 et seq. (1974); Ga. Code Ann. § 61-40 et seq. (Supp.
1975); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 80, § 16 et seq. (Smith-Hurd 1966); Ky. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 383.010 et seq. ( 1972); Md. Ann. Code, Real Prop. § 8-301
et seq. (1974); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:33-1 et seq. (Supp. 1976-1977); S.C.
Code Ann. § 41-151 (Supp. 1975); Va. Code Ann. § 55-230 (Supp. 1976);
W. Va. Code Ann. § 37-6-12 et seq. (1966). See also Mo. Ann. Stat. §
441.300 (Vernon 1952).
Some jurisdictions have landlord lien statutes which closely resemble the
distraint procedure. Generally, under these statutes, the landlord is given a
lien on the possessions of the tenant and, on default of rent payments, the
landlord has a right to seize the possessions and sell them or a right to cause
the goods to be seized and sold by a public official. E.g., Cal. Civ. Code §
1861a (West 1954); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 41-124 et seq. (1974); Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 108.510 et seq. (1975); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 44A-2 (Supp. 1975).
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take possession of property on leased premises as security for rent
in arrears, without the requirement of a .prior judicial determination
of the validity of the landlord's claim for rent or prior notice to the
tenant. 2 This right of seizure is of ancient origin, well established
in the common law, and the statute is a codification of this part of
the distress procedure. 3 Moreover, if the landlord complies with
the statute and fulfills certain requirements, the Act provides an
added remedy beyond the common law. Under the statutory rule,
the seized goods can be sold at a public sale and the landlord can
satisfy his claim for rent out of the proceeds. 4 This sale can be
Other landlord lien statutes grant the landlord a lien on the tenant's goods
and provide for other types. of enforcement procedures. E.g., Ala. Code
tit. 31, § 29 et seq. (1959); D.C. Code Ann.§ 45-915 et seq. (1973); Fla.
Stat.§ 713.67 (Supp. 1976-1977); Iowa.Code Ann.§ 570.1 et seq. (1950);
N.M. Stat. Ann.§ 61-3-4 (1974); N.Y. Lien§ 1 (McKinney 1966); Tenn.
Code Ann.§ 64-1201 (1955); Utah Code Ann. 38-3-2 et seq. (1974). See
also Mich. Comp. Laws § 427.201 et seq. ( 1967); S.D. Compiled Laws Ann.
§ 38-17-1 et seq. (1967); Wash. Rev. Code Ann.§ 60.72.010 et seq. (1961).
2 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 68, § 250.302; Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284
(E.D. Pa. 1970); Gross v. Fox, 349 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D. Pa. 1972),
vacated 496 F.2d 1153 (3d Cir. 1974); Ragin v. Schwartz, 393 F. Supp.
152 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Sum. Pa. Jur. Landlord and Tenant § 189.
Section '250.302 reads as follows:

"Personal property located upon premises occupied by a tenant shall,
unless exempted by article four of this ·act, be subject to distress for any
rent reserved and due. Such distress may be made by the landlord or his
agent duly authorized thereto in writing. Such distress may be made on
any day, except Sunday, between the hours of seven ante meridian and
seven post meridian, and not at any other time, except where the tenant
through his act prevents the execution of the warrant during such hours.
"Notice in writing of such distress, stating the cause of such taking
specifying the date of levy and the personal property distrained sufficiently
to inform the tenant or owner what personal property is distrained and
the amount of rent· in arrears, shall be given, within five days after making
the distress, to the tenant and any other owner known to the landlord
personally, or by mailing the same to the tenant or any other owner at
the premises, or by posting the same conspicuously on the premises charged
with rent.
"A landlord or such agent may also, in the manner above provided, distrain personal property located on the premises but only that belonging to
the tenant, for arrears of rent due on any lease which has ended and terminated, if such distress is made during the continuance of the landlord's
title or interest in the property."
3 Santiago v. McEiroy, note 2 supra; Sum. Pa. Jur. Landlord and Tenant
ij 189.

4

Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 68, § 250.309.
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held providing the following measures are completed. First, if the
owner of the property fails to replevy the distrained property within
five days after the distress, an appraisal must be made of the property distrained upon. 5 Thereafter, the sheriff or constable shall fix
a date, time, and place for sale, giving at least six days' public
notice in writing by handbills. Finally, on that date and time, the
selling officer must publicly sell the property and pay the landlord
the amount of rent that is owed him. 6
In recent years, there have been challenges made concerning
the constitutionality of the distraint procedure in Pennsylvania.
Some federal district courts have declared it to be incompatible
with the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution and have tl;ms held the Act to be unconstitutional. It should be emphasized, though, that there is no opinion of the Federal Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit holding
the Pennsylvania distraint provisions to be invalid. Rather, the
only court of appeals decision on the issue vacated a judgment by a
federal district court that the distress portions of the Act were unconstitutional.7 Moreover, there is no case. in which the Pennsylvania appellate courts rule that the statute is invalid. On the contrary, in one case the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
discussed th~ constitutionality of distraint and indicated that it did
not recognize any clear holQing in the federal district court cases
th~t all distraint was unconstitutional. 8
Therefore, the status of the distress portions of the Act is not
clear at this time. The confusion presents great problems to the
practicing bar in advising. both landlord and tenant clients, and
does not indicate to the legislature whether the statute needs to be
reformed and alternative remedies provided for the landlord. This
article will examine the scope and reasoning of the federal district
courts' decisions to determine the decisions' validity; it will also
survey recent trends in the due process area which cast light on the
issue of the constitutionality of Pennsylyania's distraint statute and
which give some guidelines that could be followed by the court of
s Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 68, § 250,308.
6

Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 68,

7

Gross v. Fox, note 2 supra.

§

250.309.

s Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 10 Commonwealth Ct.
596, 314 A.2d 333 (Pa. 1973), rev'd on other grounds 459 Pa. 450, 329
A.2d 812 (1974).
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appeals and the Pennsylvania appellate courts in deciding a case
on the validity of the Act.

Past Cases in the Federal Courts
The case which is most often relied on by the district courts in
finding the Pennsylvania distraint provisions unconstitutional is
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. 9 In that case, the Court found
that a Wisconsin wage garnishment statute denied due process because it authorized a prejudgment freeze on wages. Plaintiff there
alleged that the procedure denied due process of law because there
was no notice given and no opportunity for a hearing before the in
rem seizure of the wages. Under the Wisconsin l~w, the clerk of
the col.lrt issued a summons at the request of creditor's lawyer and
the latter served the garnishee and thus set in motion the machinery
by which the wages were frozen. The Court discussed this method
in light of the due process requirements of the Constitution:
Such summary procedure may well meet the requirements of due
process in extraordinary situations. [Citations omitted.] But in the
present case no situation requiring special protection to a state or
creditor interest is presented by the facts; nor is the Wisconsin statute
narrowly drawn to meet any such unusual condition. 10
The Court indicated that wages involved a special type of property
presenting distinct problems in the economic system. The great
hardships involved in wage garnishment were also shown. Often,
garnishment was based on a fraudulent debt, and it frequently
drove the wage earner below ~he poverty level and pressured him
to settle the alleged debt to get the wages back. The Court then
held that
When the taking of one's property is so obvious, it needs no extended
argument to conclude that absent notice and a prior hearing [citation
omitted] this prejudgment garnishment procedure violates the fundamental principles of due process. 11
Many of the district court opinions considered the distraint procedure and its characteristics to be "indistinguishable from
Sniadach." 12 These courts indicated that there were several factors
9

395 U.S. 337, 89 S. Ct. 1820, 23 L. Ed. 2d 349 (1969).

10

Id. at 339, 89 S. Ct. at 1821, 23 L. Ed. 2d at 352.

11

/d. at 342, 89 S. Ct. at 1823, 23 L. Ed. 2d at 354.

12

Santiago v. McElroy, note 2 supra at 293.
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that led them to apply the Sniadach ruling to the Landlord and
Tenant Act. First, the courts showed that the personal property
of the tenants was in fact being affected by the statutory procedure,
just as property being affected in Sniadach.- The levy and the eventual sale denies the tenant the right to use his property and inevitably denies him the right to freely dispose of it. 13 Second, a
basic objection was that the landlord was acting on a unilateral
claim that rent was owing when he levied on the tenant's property
to sell it. 14 The district court in Gross v. Fox said that "modern
notions of due process leave no room for landlords to be judges in
their own cases." 15 Moreover, as in Sniadach, there is no. provision
in the statute for notice to the tenant before the distraint is made
and no opportunity for a-hearing to challenge the landlord's claim. 16
Third, the courts have found that the procedures available to the
tenant to challenge the distraint are inadequate to alleviate the
hardships on the tenant and do not provide a constitutional substitute for prior notice and hearing. The tenant can challenge the
propriety of the distraint by suing in trespass. 17 However, even in
that case the property may be sold long before the litigation is
finally decided, and even if the tenant succeeds on the merits, he
will nonetheless be deprived of his property in specie:18 The statute
also allows for a suit in replevin so the tenant can recover the
goods. 19 However, the tenant must wait for the final disposition of
that action in order to regain control. 20 The courts also noted that
while certain property is statutorily exempt from levy and sale, 21

13

Gross v. Fox, note 2 supra.

Santiago v. McElroy, note 2 supra; Musselman v. Spies, 343 F. Supp.
528 (M.D. Pa. 1972).
14

15

Note 2 supra at 1167.

111 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 68, § 250.302 et seq.; Santiago v. McElroy, note 2
supra; Gross v. Fox, note 2 supra; Musselman v. Spies, note 14 supra; Stots

v. Media Real Estate Co., 355 F. Supp. 240 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Sellers v.
Contino, 327 F. Supp. 230 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
17

Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 68, § 250.312.

1s Santiago,

note 2 supra.

19

Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 68, § 250.306.

20

Ragin v. Schwartz, note 2 supra.

21

Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 68, § 250.401.
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this exemption is not broad enough to mitigate the impact of the
loss in a substantial manner. 22
Fourth, the federal district courts have indicated that the Pennsylvania distraint procedure does not fall within the exception of
Sniadach that allows summary procedures in extraordinary situations. The courts have generally followed the reasoning set forth
in Santiago:
There has been no evidence presented in this case which indicates
that the distress procedure is a response to an extraordinary situation
requiring special protection to a state or creditor interest. There has
been no evidence which indicates that it is any more difficult to. satisfy
a judgment against a tenant than against any other debtor, and none
which indicates that distress is central to the state's interest in protecting the housing market.23

Finally, the courts noted that Sniadach has not been limited
solely to its facts and has been extended to other areas. The Supreme Court relied on Sniadach to invalidate other statutes because
they denied procedural due process. 24 Thus precedent existed for
the application of Sniadach to other situations.
Therefore, with many of these factors in mind some lower federal courts in Pennsylvania have held the Pennsylvania Landlord
and Tenant Act to be invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution. However, these decisions could perhaps be
challenged on various grounds and/ or limited to the particular facts
and considerations set forth in those cases. It must be noted at the
outset that the decisions of the district courts differ in their scope.
Some holdings have ruled the Act to be unconstitutional on its
face, 25 while others have declared the statute to be invalid as applied. 26 Some cases have restricted their determination of uncon-

22

Musselman v. Spies, note 14 supra; Santiago v. McElroy, note 2 supra.

23

319 F. Supp. at 294-295.

24 See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S. Ct. 1983, 32 L. Ed. 2d
556, rehearing denied 409 U.S. 902, 93 S. Ct. 177, 34 L. Ed. 2d 165 (1972)
(Pennsylvania and Florid~ prejudgment replevin statutes); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S. Ct. 1011, 25 L. Ed. 2d 287 (1970) (withdrawal
of welfare benefits); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S. Ct. 1586, 29
L Ed. 2d 90 (1971) (suspension of driver's license).

2s Stots v. Media Real Estate Co., note 16 supra; Gross v. Fox, note 2
supra.
2, Santiago

v. McElroy, note 2 supra; Sellers v. Contino, note 16 supra.
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stitutionality to separate provisions of the Act, 27 while others have
dealt with the Act as a whole. 28

Unconstitutionality "As Applied"
Distress Sales Prohibited in Cases Involving
Lower-Income Residential Tenants
The decisions finding unconstitutionality "as applied" should be
examined to determine both their validity and their reach. The
Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has
heard quite a number of constitutional challenges to the Pennsylvania Landlord and Tenant Act. 29 The first of ·these opinions,
Santiago v. McElroy, was written by Chief Judge Lord and was the
first federal district court opinion in all of Pennsylvania on the
validity of distraint. Santiago dealt with a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983
claim alleging that defendants, who were constables (now landlord
and tenant officers) of the City of Philadelphia, denied plaintiffs
· due process of law by conducting levies and sales pursuant. to the
Pennsylvania Act. The suit was. brought as a class action, and the
plaintiff class was defined by the court to be low-income tenants
residing in Philadelphia. ("Low income" was defined in terms of
the pov~rty line used by the Office of Economic Opportunity.) The
court ruled that plaintiffs did not sustain• their burden of showing
that the levy and steps taken prior Jo the sale harmed them in any
fashion, and that the record did not provide an adequate basis for
the finding that the provisions of the Act, other than the provisions
authorizing sale of tenant's property after distress, violate the
Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, the court enjoined the defendants from making sales of property pursuant to Section 250.309
of the Act. Note "that the court ( 1) did not find facial unco:qstitutionality, (2) limited the plaintiff class, and (3) dealt only with the
sales provisions of the Act.
In Sellers v. Contino, the ruling of Santiago was extended to
Delaware County. 30 The court again limited the plaintiff class to
27

Santiago v. McElroy, note 2 supra; Musselman v. Spies, note 14 supra.

2a Stots v. Media Real Estate Co., note 16 supra.
29 E.g., Santiago v. McElroy, note 2 supra; Gross v. Fox, note 2 supra;
Stots v. Media Real Estate Co., note 16 supra; Litton ,Business Sys., Inc. v.
Paul L'Esperance, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 1265 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
30

Note 16 supra.
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tenants of Delaware County with income below the OEO poverty
level. The court also limited their finding of unconstitutionality to
the sales provisions of the Act, finding that no deprivation of the
use of property was shown by a distraint notice left on the premises
as long as the property was not removed.
Musselman v. Spies, decided by the Federal District Court for
the Middle District of Pennsylvania, 31 also found unconstitutionality "as applied" rather-· than facial invalidity. The court in Musselman relied on the holding and rationale of Santiago. The plaintiff
class was found to- be tenants residing in York County with aJJ income below the OEO poverty line. The court also confined itself
to the distress sales provisions of Section 250.309. Thus, the, coulj
enjoined the defendant constables from selling, threatening to sell,
advertising for sale, or removing from leased premises .any property
belonging to or found in homes of members of the plaintiff class.
Some questions can be raised concerning ·the basis of these decisions and their ultimate reach as precedents. First of all, the
district courts' opinions virtually ignored the important concerns
and special problems of the landlord. There was no discussion of
the historical and practical reasons for the distraint procedure. The
West Virginia Supreme Court in State ex rel Payne v. Walker, 32
while declaring the West Virginia distraint statute to be unconstitutional, ably stated the needs and hardships of the landlord:
Undoubtedly, there are special characteristics incident to the landlord
tenant relationship which may justify·statutory treatment inapplicable
to other litigants. The tenant is, by definition, in possession of property of the landlord. Unless the law leaves an aggrieved landlord to
his own devices, the legislature must provide a judicial mechanism of
relative swiftness to prevent the withholding tenant from denying the
landlord the right of income incident to ownership by the tenant's
refusal to pay rent- and by his prevention of rental or sale to a third
party. Many expenses of the landlord continue to accrue, whether the
tenant pays his rent or not.JJ

Because the district court opinions failed to specifically discuss these
basic landlord interests, the results r~ached by the district courts in
Santiago, Musselman, and Sellers can be questioned.
Second, it should be noted that Santiago, Sellers, and Musselman
held that there was unconstitutionality only in the sales provisions
31

Note 14 supra.

32

190 S.E.2d 770 (W. Va. S. Ct. 1972).

33

Jd. at 778.
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of the Pennsylvania Landlord and Tenant Act. 34 It thus seems that
after these cases there can still be distress ( which would establish a
lien on the goods) as long as the goods are not removed and/ or
sold.
Third, Santiago, Musselman, and Sellers specifically deal with a
limited class of plaintiffs, i.e., low-income "consumer" tenants of
residential space. The courts in these cases specifically refused to
broaden the class to include moderate-income groups. In Santiago,
the court limited the size of the class "in light of the fact that all
the evidence developed in this case relates to the distraint of low
income tenants, and there being no showing that the same facts
obtained in the case of moderate income tenants. . . ." 35 It is not
clear, though, why the courts have refused to include middle-income
groups in tlfe class. This limitation to lower-income tenants could
be the result of the district courts' heavy reliance on Sniadach. As
discussed above, Sniadach was especially concerned with the great
negative effects that wage garnishment had on lower-income
families.
Will Protections Extend to Higher-Income
Residential Tenants?

The Pennsylvania appellate courts and/or the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit could choose to maintain a distinction between
the lower-income residential tenants of Santiago, and middle- and
upper-income residential tenants, and thus limit the applicability of
any future ruling of unconstitutionality of distraint· to the poorer
group. However, the courts could well decide that despite the
wealth of the tenant, the guarantees of due process must be extended to all persons, and that all residential tenants are entitled to
notice and hearing before distraint. Despite the statement in
Santiago that there was no showing that the facts presented therein
obtain in the case of moderate-income tenants, it could be argued
that it is hard to imagine what key information could be different
in the case of a middle- or upper-income family. All factors with
which the courts were concerned would seem to be the same regardless of wealth: All tenants are denied use of their property by
the distraint and sale; in all cases the landlord is acting on a uni34

Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 68, § 250.309.

35

319 F. Supp. at 290.
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lateral claim with no opportunity for notice and hearing; and all
tenants are restricted to the same actions to challenge the distraint.
The only real difference seems to be the effect of the deprivation on
the individual.
A court could perhaps avoid a broad declaration of unconstitutionality applying to all residential tenants by relying on a narrow
view of Santiago. The major concern in Santiago was that distraint
of a poor family's goods would deprive the family of property
necessary to keep at the subsistence level. This will not usually
be the case with higher-income families. However, even if this were
true, it is not at all clear whether or not the effect of the distraint
is a valid criterion in deciding what protections are to be afforded
to tenants by procedural due process. This question of the importance of the effect of the distraint appears to be crucial a11d
remains to be determined by the Pennsylvania appellate courts and/
or the court of appeals. It should be noted, though, that Sniadach
unconditionally invalidated the Wisconsin wage garnishment statute
and did not just limit the declaration of unconstitutionality to
poorer WQrkers who suffered the most disastrous effects from the
procedure. This decision may cast doubt on any attempt to distinguish between richei:, and poorer tenants for the purpose of an
attack on the distress procedure.
Moreover, it should not be extremely difficult to provide for both
notice and hearing to determine the underlying validity of the landlord's claim before the actual distress seizure or sale. Such a reasonably expedient alternative adds weight to the argument for total
unconstitutionality of distraint.
Do Commercial Tenants Share Residents' Rights?

Even more difficult questions arise in reference to whether the
Pennsylvania appellate courts and/ or the court of appeals should
declare distraint unconstitutional in the case of a landlord and a
commercial tenant. A commercial tenant, with experience in the
business world and with assets, who fails to pay rent and has his
property seized in distress is a far different person than the povertystricken tenant of Santiago or even a wealthier residential tenant.
The case of a. commercial tenant defaulting on rent may well be
"a situation requiring special protection to a state or creditor interest," 36 and thus distraint may be permitted.
36

Sniadach v. Family Fin. Co., note 10 supra.
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Therefore, some courts may distinguish between commercial and
residential tenants as far as the constitutionality of distraint.
Factors in such a decision could be the experience and financial
position of the commercial tenant as opposed to a consumer, the
fact that distraint of a commercial tenant's goods will not usually
deprive the tenant of property necessary to keep at subsistence level
and drive the tenant into poverty, and the legitimate and pressing
concerns of the landlord in receiving paymen'ts due from lhe tenant
for the use of the landlord's property.
However, a court -could reject any distinction between commercial and residential property and decide that any declaration of
unconstitutionality of distraint should be extended to commercial
tenants. Most commercial leases, like residential leases, are contracts of adhesion with no bargaining over terms. Thus a commercial tenant is also confronted by the weight and pressure of
landlords and form leases. To add the large statutory advantage
of distraint to the landlord's position could be considered impermissible by the· courts.
Moreover, the recent case of North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v.
Di-Chem,Jnc. lends support to the position that distraint should be
declared unconstitutional for commercial property as well as residential. 37 In that case a corporation, against which a suit for alleged indebtedness had been brought, challenged the constitutionality of a Georgia statute under which the plaintiff corporation had
garnished the defendant's back account. The Georgia statute
allowed garnishment solely on affidavit by the collector's attorney
and without participation of a judge. The Supreme Court held
the statute unconstitutional. The Court specifically rejected the
notion that because two companies were involved the rationale
of Sniadach should not be applied:
Respondent also argues that neither Fuentes nor Mitchell is apposite
here because those cases dealt with the application of due process
protections to consumers who -are victims of contracts of adhesion
and who might be irreparably damaged by t~mporary deprivation of
household necessities, whereas·this case deals with its application in
the commercial setting to a case involving parties of equal bargaining
power. . . . It may be that con~umers deprived of household appliances will more likely suffer irreparably than corporations deprived
of bank accounts but the prob.ability of irreparable injury in the latter
case is sufficiently great so that some procedures are necessary to
guard against the risk of initial error. We are no more inclined now
37

419 U.S. 601, 95 S. Ct. 719, 42 L. Ed. 2d 751 (1974).
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than we have been in the past to distinguish among different kinds of
property in apply~ng to Due Process Clause. 38 (Emphasis added.)

Therefore, it is quite possible that the Pennsylvania distraint statute
could be invalidated for both residential and commercial tenants by
applying the force of North Georgia Finishing, and the broad scope
of its language.
The case of Van Ness Industries, Inc. v. Claremont Printing &
Decorating, Inc. is of interest in this regard. 39 Under the New Jersey statute, distraint was forbidden by an amendment in 1971 for
money owed on a lease for property used solely as a residence. 40
Distraint was allowed for commercial property. However, the court
in Van Ness held that the statute was facially unconstitutional and
that distraint was impermissible for commercial, as well as residential, property because the statute was inconsistent with the requirements of due process.
Despite the rejection of distinctions_ between consumer and commercial interests in reference to due process requirements in North
Georgia Finishing, the recognition of a difference between residential and commercial tenants formed the basis of the decision of the
Federal District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania in
Ginsberg v. George Stern Advertising ·Agency, Inc. 41 It must be
emphasized, though, that Ginsberg predated North Georgia Finishing. Ginsberg dealt with a tenant who purchased the rights and
obligations of prior tenants under the terms of a written lease
covering certain storeroom premises wherein he conducted a delicatessen and sandwich shop business. The tenant failed to pay
the $333.33 monthly rental due for each of the three months.
After two unanswered demands for payment from the landlord's attorneys, the constable acting on the landlord's behalf distrained
property of the tenant to satisfy a claim of $4,815, and gave notice
of a sale. Even though the demanded sum was reduced, the tenant
did not pay. it and the distrained goods were sold at public sale.
The tenant brought suit challenging the constitutionality of the
Landlord and Tenant Act. The court noted that there was no
diversity of citizenship and that less than $10,000 was involved.
The court then said that
38

Id. at 608, 95 S. Ct. at 723, 42 L. Ed. 2d at 758.

39

129 N.J. Super. 507, 324 A.2d 102 (Ch. 1974) .

.co N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:33-1 et seq.
41

325 F. Supp. 349 (W.D. Pa. 1971).

REAL ESTATE LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 5 : 242 1977]

254

There has been no showing of any deprivation of plaintiff's personal
rights by the distraint and sale for $2,500 of the commercial property
on the leased premises and, hence, this court has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of this civil rights action. 42 (Emphasis added.)

The court specifically rejected the jurisdictional reasoning of Santiago, noting that there was no showing that the tenant could not
secure employment in the delicatessen business (in which he had
over forty years' experience) and that the tenant had never been
on welfare. (In Santiago, the court assumed arguendo that 28
U.S.C. Section 1343 (3) did not cover property rights but assumed
that the tenants' claims involved taking of household goods. The
court then concluded that the deprivation of such property necessary to keep a family at subsistence level is covered by 28 U.S.C.
Section 1343 (3 ).)
The district court in Ginsberg seemingly found differences between a lower-income residential tenant and a commercial tenant
as far as recognizing the right to challenge distraint. The court
placed much emphasis on the facts that when plaintiff had acquired the lease he had been advised by counsel who explained
its terms, that plaintiff was aware that the landlord had remedies
under the lease, that the lease was of a commercial nature, and that
the tenant had a $13,000 equity in his home as well as other
property assets.
However, as noted above, Ginsberg predated North Georgja
Finishing. Thus the present validity of Ginsberg is somewhat doubtful because of the U.S. Supreme Court's rejection of commercial/
consumer distinction in reference to due process. Ginsberg is even
more questionable in light of the decision of the Supreme Court in
Lynch v. Household Finance Corp. 43 In that. case a Connecticut
resident's savings account was garnished under a state statute
authorizing summary prejudicial garnishment. Plaintiff brought
suit seeking 'to enjoin enforcement of the statu~e as denying due
process. The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that
28 U.S.C. Section 1343 (3) applied only to deprivations of "personal'' rights and not "property" rights. The Supreme Court reversed and specifically rejected any distinction between personal
liberties and property rights as far as Section 1343 (3) jurisdiction.
-'2

Id. at 351.

-'3405 U.S. 538, 92 S. Ct. 1113, 31 L. Ed. 2d 424 (1972), rehearing

denied 406 U.S. 911, 92 S. Ct. 1611, 31 L. Ed. 2d 822 (1972).
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The Court said that the Fourteenth Amendment protected the
right to enjoy, own, and dispose of property, and that such protection was included in 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and 28 U.S.C. Section
1343(3).
Finally, if a distinction between commercial and residential tenants in regard to distraint were upheld, it is not clear how a lowerincome commercial tenant would be treated. Such a tenant bears a
similarity to both the poor lessee of Santiago and the commercial
tenant of Ginsberg.

Facial Unconstitutionality
The Pennsylvania Statute

Some federal district courts have indeed declared the Pennsylvania Landlord and Tenant Act to be facially unconstitutional.
However, as will be shown, one decision has been vacated and the
precedential value of the others is also doubtful. There does not
seem to be a clear and valid case holding the Pennsylvania Landlord and Tenant Act to be facially unconstitutional at the federal
district court level. The· applicability of past decisions, even just
within the district courts, can be questioned.
The first federal district court case to declare the Pennsylvania
Landlord and Tenant Act to be unconstitutional on its face was
Gross v. Fox, in an opinion by Chief Judge Lord. 44 The plaintiff
was granted a declaratory judgment of the invalidity of Act Section
250.302 et seq. because there was no notice or hearing before the
distraint. The effect of such a broad declaration. could have been
great as it could have applied to all tenants and all types of property.
However, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in its only
opinion on the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania Act, vacated
the judgment of the district court. 45 The court was concerned with
the fact that the issue was mooted by plaintiff's termination of her
lease, the constitutional issue need not have been reached, the
declaratory judgment would not end 'the controversy, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania did not appear as a party, and the
statute could be amended before another complaint challenging it
were filed. The court thus ruled that declaratory relief was inappropriate considering the posture of the litigation.
44

349 F. Supp. 1164 (B.D. Pa. 1972).

,s Gross v. Fox, 496 F.2d 1153 (1974).
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The reasons for the decision of the court of appeals decision are
not clear. The court could have been showing the district courts
that it does not agree with the theory that all distraint i!i unconstitutional. Or, it could have been delaying a review of the statute,
perhaps till a clearer case came before it.
The Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania again held the Act unconstitutional on its face in Stots v.
Media Real Estate. 46 The court relied heavily on the district court
opinion in Gross, which was not vacated till after the opinion in
Stots. Chief Judge Lord wrote in Stots that after Gross, presentation of evidence would be nothing but a "ritualistic time consumption." The court ordered that pursuant to Gross a declaratory
judgment be entered declaring Section 250.302 et seq. unconstitutional. However, while Stots has not been overruled, it is of doubtful validity because of its heavy reliance on Gross, which has been
vacated as discussed above.
Litton Business Systems, Inc. v. Paul L'Esperance, Inc., 47 which
is a recent case on the unconstitutionality of the Pennsylvania distraint statute, is also of questionable value since it relied strongly
on Stots. The court in Litton cited and applied the holding of
facial unconstitutionality of Stots. Litton held that the plaintiff
corporation was entitled to the return of two copying machines
which were seized in distress when the tenant to whom the machines
were leased failed to pay rent. It should be noted that this case
presented the special problem of a third party drawn into a dispute
between a landlord and a tenant. Moreover, by relying on a flat
declaration of facial unconstitutionality, the court avoided the examination of differences between residential and commercial
tenants.
The most recent case in the federal district courts dealing with
the constitutionality of distraint is Ragin v. Schwartz:48 That case
was brought as a class action with the plaintiff class being all the
residents of Allegheny County who rent their residences and are
thus potentially subject to distraint. The court granted the plaintiffs
the injunctive relief they sought. The court did not distinguish between facial unconstitutionality and unconstitutionality as applied.

46

355 F. Supp. 243 (E.D. Pa. 1973).

47

Note 29 supra.

48

Note 2 supra.

j
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However, it seems that this judgment, while limited in geographical
area, apparently reflected a belief by the district judge that the
statute was unconstitutional on its face, and the opinion can be
best understood when viewed in this manner.
Distraint Laws of Other States

Some mention must be made of decisions in other ,jurisdictions
holding statutory distraint procedures to be facially unconstitutional. As in Pennsylvania, federal district courts have been active
in this process while state, courts have been relatively inactive. Holt
v. Brown held that the Kentucky distr~int statute was facially unconstitutional because it allowed for seizure and sale of property
without notice or hearing:49 The factual situation in Holt was not
discussed in the court's opinion. The West Virginia distraint
statute was also held invalid by ~ federal district court. so
The West Virginia Supreme Court found that state's distress
statutes to be unconstitutional on its face, because there was no provision for notice and hearing, in State ex rel. Payne v. Walden.s 1
The opinion, referred to previously, is of note for its thoroughness
and clarity. The Georgia distraint statute was invalidated by that
state's supreme court in Blocker v .. Blackburn. 52

Pennsylvania State Court Cases
As mentioned earlier, there are no Pennsylvania cases on the
appellate level ruling on the constitutionality of the state's distraint
statute. However, one recent case before the Commonwealth Court
of Pennsylvania discussed the constitutionality of distraint, Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, lnc. 53 Monumental dealt
"' 336 F. Supp. 2 (W.D. Ky. 1971).
50

Shaffer v. Holbrook, 346 F. Supp. 762 (D.C. W. Va. 1972).

s1 190 S.E.2d 770 (W. Va. 1972) ..
s2 228 Ga. 285, 185 S.E.2d 56 (.1971).

In related cases federal courts have declared landlord lien statutes,
which allow the impressment of a lien on the tenant's personal property
for allegedly unpaid rent without notice or hearing, to be unconstitutional.
E.g., Dielen v. Levine, 344 F. Supp. 823 tD. Neb. 1972); Adams v. Joseph
P. Sanson Inv. Co., 376 F. Supp. 61 (D. Nev. 1974); Barber v. Rader, 350
F. Supp. 183 (S.D. Fla. 1972); MacQueen v. Lambert, 348 F. Supp. 1334
(M.D. Fla. 1972); Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970).
53

10 Commonwealth Ct. at 596, 314 A.2d at 333.
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with a suit under the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law54 to enjoin alleged violations of the statute arising out
of the use of "legal forms" in the leasing of property. The court
said in reference to distraint that
The landlord's right to distrain for rent was upheld by our appellate
courts in the case of McAnniny v. Miller, 19 Pa. Super. 406 (1902).
This case has not been overruled by any appellate court. Admittedly,
there are Federal lower court decisions which have held that under
certain sets of circumstances, the right to distrain may be unconstitutional. See Qross v. Fox, 349 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Musselman v. Spies, 343 F. Supp. 528 (M.D. Pa. 1972); Sellers v. Contino, 327 F. Supp. 230 (E.D. Pa. 1971) and Santiago v. McElroy,
319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970). As we read these Federal cases,
however, we do not discern any firm holding that all clauses of distraint are unconstitutional. 55
The Commonwealth Court went on to hold that leases are not within the Consumer Protection La'Y. This holding was overruled by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 56 which held that leases were
within the scope of the statute and.remanded the case to the Commonwealth Court to consider the validity of the leases under attack.
No further disposition of the case is reported as of this writing.
It should be pointed out that McAnniny v. Miller, 57 which was
cited by the Commonwealth Court, only" briefly mentioned that a
distress sale performed by a landlord was valid. McAnniny did not
face the issue of constitutionality. Similarly, in Mountcastle v.
Schumann, the court dealt with questions concerning the correct
method of distraint under law. 58 Although the court at one point
said that "the landlord's right to distrain has long been favored by
the law ...," 59 the problem of constitutionality was never considered.
Finally, there is one common pleas decision dealing with the
constitutionality of the distraint provisions of the Pennsylvania
Landlord and Tenant Act. 60 Bank of Hanover involved a challenge
54

Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73, § 201-1 et seq.

55

10 Commonwealth Ct. at 611-612, 314 A.2d at 370.

56

459 Pa. 450, 329 A.2d 812 (1974).

57

19 Pa. Super. 406 (1902).

58

205 Pa. Super. 21, 205 A.2d 642 (1965).

59

Id. at 25, 205 A.2d at 644.

60 Bank of Hanover & Trust Co. v. Oxford Wood Prods., Inc., 16 Adams
L.J. 23 (1974).
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by a tenant to a distraint made on };lis property. Initially, the landlord distrained the tenant's property but no sale was held. Approximately six months later, the landlord distrained again on the same
property since his counsel felt that the first distraint might have
been invalid because of the manner in which it was performed.
The court held that the second distraint was invalid because an
initial distraint can only be abandoned and a new proceeding instituted only where there was insufficient property to satisfy the first
distress or where there was a mistake in the evaluation of the property. The court also cited the district court's holding of facial unconstitutionality in Gross v. Fox. Still, the court basically relied on
the technical violations to invalidate the distraint and glossed over
the constitutional question.
Conclusion
The status of the Pennsylvania distraint statute is not clear.
There is no case in which the Pennsylvania appellate courts or the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit squarely face the issue
of the constitutionality of the Act. However, a strong case exists
for declaring the distraint provisions of the statute to be invalid for
all residential property because of the logic and weight of the
modem decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court concerning the requirements of procedural due process. Moreover, after the Supreme
Court's recent rejection of a distinction between consumer and
commercial interests in reference to procedural due process in
North Georgia Finishing, the precedent and reasoning exist to declare the Pennsylvania distraint statute to be unconstitutional in its
entirety and for all groups of tenants.

OLD-AGE SECURITY

When prodded about providing low-cost housing, suburbs tend to point to
developments that set aside a certain number of units for the elderly. Old
people, as a rule, are not dangerous. They do not, as a rule, produce children. Peter Wolf, a New York planner who has often written about zoning
problems, has suggested that if elderly couples realized how valuable they
were to suburban planners, they might auction themselves off.
-The New Yorker
February 2, 1976

